


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July 21, 1959

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT
July 21, 1959

Others present: Secretary Dillon
General Goodpaster



Mr. Dillon referred to a message just in from Secretary Herter for the President (CAHTO 156) expressing the view that the Geneva conference seems to have reached a stalemate and that he had in mind to call for its early termination, considering this action would either move the Russians if Gromyko's position is merely tactical, or disclose finally that there is no basis for accommodation. Mr. Dillon said he and his associates thought this action is still a little too early. If it were taken this week, it would throw the Vice President into the middle of negotiations when he sees Khrushchev. He commented that we have had no answer yet from Khrushchev to the President's recent letter carried by Kozlov. The President said he doubts if we will receive one now. Mr. Dillon commented that his associates thought it likely the reply would come in the next few days, now that Khrushchev has returned from Poland.

The President said that, in light of the foregoing, he thought the best action for Mr. Herter is to seek a three or four day recess, and for Mr. Nixon to say to Khrushchev as soon as he sees him that it appears the Geneva conference cannot be saved, and that since Gromyko apparently is unable to accept any kind of a solution acceptable to the West, it may as well be terminated.

The President said that Khrushchev might well do something at this point that would require the Vice President to cut off his visit and return home. He stressed again that the Vice President must not get into any negotiating activity.

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Commenting further, the President said it would not hurt for Mr. Herter to express doubt at once that there will be any useful result from the Geneva meeting, and to have the Vice President say at his first meeting with Khrushchev that the President is ready to give up the Geneva effort. The Vice President could then report to us Sunday night after he sees Khrushchev. On this timing, we would be ready to take definitive action in Geneva on about Tuesday, and Mr. Herter might call for a recess then. Suggesting the form these remarks might take, the President thought Mr. Herter could say that in view of the impasse that has developed he wanted to take a few days to think the situation over. Then when we see what happens to the Vice President, we could tell Mr. Herter to wind the conference up.

Mr. Dillon then gave the President an edited version of the redrafted message from the President that the Vice President might carry to the Moscow Fair. The President said he would read this in conjunction with another draft that he had before him.

Mr. Dillon then brought up one further question relating to the forward schedule of State visits. He assumed there would be none beyond about next June, in view of the political campaign then beginning. The President said he has had enough of them now but would take a few more if the State Department thinks they would have real value. He asked what Mr. Dillon had in mind. Mr. Dillon recalled that the King of Nepal has already been invited. They propose to add the King of Afghanistan, the King of Siam (who has been asking for an invitation for several years) and the Prime Minister of Indonesia. After discussion, the President said it would be all right to invite these people for some dates after mid-November and prior to the first of April. He recalled that the President of Mexico may come to visit this fall. The Mexicans had stated a preference for a visit on an informal basis. The President said he might take him to Camp David, but he also asked Mr. Dillon to study the possibility of having the meeting in Phoenix, San Antonio or elsewhere.

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A. J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

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